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DETERMINING A RELATIONSHIP IN 
THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE: THE 
IMPACT OF RUKA ON THE 
DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND 
INCOME’S CONJUGAL STATUS 
POLICY 
Jessica Wiseman* 
In the 1997 case of Ruka v Department of Social Welfare, the Court of Appeal altered the 
test for determining whether a relationship was "in the nature of marriage" for the purposes of the 
Social Security Act 1964.  In this article, the author analyses the impact of the decision on 
Department of Work and Incomes practice and on the subsequent decisions of the Social Security 
Appeal Authority.  The author questions whether either Department or Appeal Authority has 
significantly altered their policy in light of the test adopted by the majority in Ruka.  In light of its 
practical application, the author then critically accesses the test in Ruka and concludes that the 
general approach favoured by previous decisions of the High Court, and apparently continued by 
the Department subsequent to Ruka, is preferable. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Ruka v Department of Social Welfare1 is the leading case on the determination of 
"relationships in the nature of marriage" (colloquially referred to as "de facto 
relationships") in the context of the Social Security Act 1964.  Prior to Ruka, the leading 
cases were Excell v Department of Social Welfare2 and Thompson v Department of Social 
  
*  This paper was submitted in fulfillment of the LLB(Hons) requirements at Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2000. 
1 Ruka v Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 NZLR 154 (CA) [Ruka]. 
2 Excell v Department of Social Welfare [1991] NZFLR 241 (HC) [Excell]. 
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Welfare.3  Excell and Thompson are characterised by weighing a range of factors, followed 
by an overall assessment as to whether the relationship is in the nature of marriage.  Ruka 
changed the test by making financial interdependence, together with emotional 
commitment, essential. 
It has been said it is easier to recognise a de facto relationship than to define one.4  This 
problem is addressed in the Social Security Act by section 63(b), which gives the chief 
executive of the Department of Work and Income the discretion to "regard as husband and 
wife any man and woman who, not being legally married, have entered into a relationship 
in the nature of marriage".5 
The discretion is delegated under section 10(1) to officers of the Department, including 
frontline staff, who make the initial evaluation about an applicant's conjugal status.  
Exercise of the discretion is governed by the Department's conjugal status policy.   Section 
63 also confers a discretion to determine when an applicant entered into a relationship, 
and to grant or refuse to grant a benefit, or terminate, reduce, or increase any benefit 
already granted, from that date accordingly.  The assessment is to be made on a "purely 
objective basis" (the words "in the opinion of the Commission" having been removed).6 
Conjugal status affects eligibility for benefits.  A person who is legally married or 
living in a relationship in the nature of marriage is not eligible for the domestic purposes7 
or widows' benefits.  Conversely, a woman is eligible for the widows' benefit if the 
relationship with her deceased partner was in the nature of marriage.8  For other benefits, 
such as the unemployment benefit or student allowances, the combined income of both 
partners is taken into account when assessing eligibility.9  The objective of section 63(b) "is 
to ensure that unmarried couples who enter into a relationship akin to marriage are not  
 
  
3 Thompson v Department of Social Welfare [1994] 2 NZLR 369 (HC) [Thompson]. 
4 See for example William R Atkin Living Together Without Marriage (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1991) 13. 
5  A married beneficiary may be regarded as unmarried if they are "living apart" from their wife or 
husband under s 63(a). 
6 Thompson, above n 3, following Social Security Appeal Authority Decision No 567 (1980) 2 NZAR 565. 
7 Except where they care for a sick or infirm person at home: Social Security Act 1964, s 27G. 
8 Social Security Act 1964, s 21(2D). 
9 If eligible, the benefit is paid at the married rate, which is less than the amount paid to two single 
people as it takes into account the economies of scale available to a married couple. 
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treated more favourably for benefit purposes than those who are legally married."10  It is 
crucial, therefore, to determine whether a beneficiary is living in a relationship in the 
nature of marriage. 
The phrase is not defined in the legislation, however, and it is well recognised in the 
cases that defining it is no simple task.11  The Marriage Act 1955 requires legal marriages 
to be created by the observance of formalities12 and prohibits certain relationships.13  By 
contrast, de facto relationships typically have no clear beginning,14 and the types of 
relationship a person may enter into are regulated only by the criminal law, such as the 
law relating to incest and minors. 
For guidance in interpreting the phrase, officers rely on Department policy manuals, 
which are informed by case law and Department practice. 
In response to criticism that the Department policy is outdated, it has been revised 
recently to reflect the law more accurately.  I will suggest, however, that in practice the 
changes are not as great as some commentators would argue are warranted.  I will 
consider the way Ruka differs from Excell and Thompson, then analyse the Department's 
conjugal status policy and how it has changed since Ruka.  I will then discuss the 
application of Ruka in Social Security Appeal Authority decisions.  I will identify some 
problems with the focus on financial interdependence in Ruka, and suggest that it may, 
after all, be preferable to determine the nature of a relationship by making an overall 
assessment of various factors, and asking whether the parties have "so merged their lives" 
that it can be said their relationship is in the nature of marriage. 
  
10 Ruka, above n 1, 181 per Thomas J; echoing Tipping J in Thompson, above n 3, 374.  Section 63 does 
not apply to same-sex relationships.  Applicants in same-sex relationships may therefore be 
supported by a partner and also receive a benefit, and conversely, be ineligible for other benefits.  
Although this seems outdated and inequitable, extending the policy to include same-sex 
relationships would require amending the Social Security Act, as s 63(b) expressly refers to "any 
man and woman". 
11 See for example Lichtenstein v Lichtenstein (1986) 4 NZFLR 25 (HC). 
12 A licence must be obtained and the marriage must be solemnised by a marriage celebrant: 
Marriage Act 1955, s 21. 
13 Marriage Act 1955, 2nd Schedule. 
14 Nor do they necessarily have a clear ending; compare the formal procedures required to dissolve 
a marriage: Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
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II IMPACT OF RUKA ON THE DEFINITION OF A "RELATIONSHIP IN 
THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE" 
A High Court 
In Excell, a legally married couple were found to be "living together" under section 27B 
of the Social Security Act, but the case was argued as if the test was whether they had 
entered into a relationship in the nature of marriage.15  Fisher J summarised the "core 
elements of cohabitation" as:  a "mental commitment to live together as husband and wife 
and a manifestation of that commitment by conduct", with no minimum period; "the 
cumulative quality, quantity, continuity and duration" of factors indicating a 
relationship;16 "indicia" including (but not limited to) "pooling of labour and financial 
resources" and "provision of financial assistance", shared dwelling, "emotional dependence 
and support", shared household activities; and the duration of the relationship and "signs 
of permanence for the future".17  Finally, "a broad value judgment is required".18 
In Thompson, Tipping J said, "[i]nherent in the concept of a relationship in the nature of 
marriage are both mental and physical aspects", and the physical aspects should usually be 
considered first.19  Ten aspects are listed, similar to Fisher J's indicia in Excell.  Sharing 
"costs and other financial responsibilities by the pooling of resources or otherwise" is 
seventh on the list.20  Sometimes other factors will also "require assessment in the overall 
picture", and the "ultimate decision will always be one of fact and degree."21  The "mental 
ingredient" comprises "some commitment by the parties to their relationship ... for the 
foreseeable future.  Any lesser commitment would ... be neither sufficient for nor 
consistent with a relationship in the nature of marriage".22  The "flavour of the essential 
issue" can then be "captured by asking whether the parties have so merged their lives, for 
  
15 This did "full justice to the appellant", as "it is easier for the prosecution to demonstrate that a 
legally married couple are 'living together' than to demonstrate that a couple who are not legally 
married have entered into a relationship in the nature of marriage": Excell, above n 2, 246.  
Compare Tipping J in Thompson, above n 3, 372: "[L]iving apart is not necessarily the exact 
corollary of entering into a relationship in the nature of marriage.  Some guidance can however be 
obtained from the reverse side of the coin, provided care is taken." 
16 Excell, above n 2, 248. 
17 Excell, above n 2, 248. 
18 Excell, above n 2, 248. 
19 Thompson, above n 3, 373. 
20 Thompson, above n 3, 373. 
21 Thompson, above n 3, 373. 
22 Thompson, above n 3, 374. 
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the time being, that they are, for all practical purposes, living together as a married 
couple."23  Finally, "the ultimate question must be answered in a broad practical way and 
in a manner consistent with the object of s 63".24 
B Social Security Appeal Authority 
A beneficiary may dispute a section 63(b) determination by applying under section 
10A of the Social Security Act to have the determination reviewed by the Benefits Review 
Committee.  The beneficiary also has a right of appeal under section 12J to the Social 
Security Appeal Authority, an independent tribunal.  The Appeal Authority's decisions are 
important because most beneficiaries do not have the resources to appeal from there to the 
High Court, unless they obtain legal aid.  Moreover, appeals to the High Court are on 
questions of law only.25  Appeal Authority decisions prior to Ruka clearly show Excell and 
Thompson being applied. 
For example, in Decision 75/96, the Authority said "reliance must be made upon the 
High Court decision of Excell" in section 63(b) cases, and the Authority members agreed 
with Fisher J's proposition that it is the "cumulative effect of various items ... which assist 
in the determination of whether a relationship in the nature of marriage exists."26  The 
Authority looked at indicators such as shared accommodation and domestic tasks, shared 
finances, outside activities and trips together.  The appellant said there was no sexual 
relationship or commitment for the future, but following Excell, the Authority said "simply 
because one aspect was lacking" did not mean there was no relationship in the nature of 
marriage,27 and "[o]n balance we hold that the cumulative effect of the factors we have 
listed ... are such as to outweigh the other matters that we have referred to."28 
C Ruka 
In Ruka the Court of Appeal re-examined the phrase "relationship in the nature of 
marriage".  Both the majority judgments (Blanchard J and Richardson P in a joint judgment 
delivered by Blanchard J, and Thomas J) and the dissenting judgment (Henry and Gault JJ 
in a joint judgment delivered by Henry J) referred to the "checklist" approach which may 
be discerned from Thompson, and acknowledged that lists of relevant factors may be 
  
23 Thompson, above n 3, 374. 
24 Thompson, above n 3, 374. 
25 Social Security Act 1964, s 12Q. 
26 Decision 75/96 (24 July 1996) Social Security Appeal Authority  (Latham, Dell, Morgan) 3. 
27 Decision 75/96, above n 26, 3. 
28 Decision 75/96, above n 26, 5-6. 
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helpful in some cases.29  Considering the purpose of the Social Security Act, however, the 
majority reformulated the test.  They found that the Act's "emphasis on loss of financial 
support"30 meant that "financial interdependence" between the parties was crucial:31 
[A] relationship in the nature of marriage for the purpose of the Social Security Act is one in 
which an essential element is that there is an acceptance by one partner that (to take the 
stereotypical role) he will support the other partner and any child or children of the 
relationship if she has no income of her own or to the extent that it is or becomes inadequate.  
The commitment must go beyond mere sharing of living expenses, as platonic flatmates or 
siblings living together may do; it must amount to a willingness to support, if the need exists.  
There must be at least that degree of financial engagement or understanding between the 
couple.  It will not, however, be negated by a refusal to support, or an arrangement that 
support will not be given, which is motivated by the knowledge that the dependent partner 
will then be able to claim a benefit.  Such a stratagem cannot create a genuine absence of 
support. 
In addition to financial interdependence, emotional commitment is required:32 
Where financial support is available nevertheless there will not be a relationship in the nature 
of marriage for this purpose unless that support is accompanied by sufficient features 
evidencing a continuing emotional commitment not arising just from a blood relationship.  Of 
these, the sharing of the same roof and of a sexual relationship (especially if it produces 
offspring) are likely to be the most significant indicators. 
Thomas J agreed with the approach of the other majority judges, but seemed to reverse 
the emphasis:33 
[T]here must be a mutual commitment on the part of the parties to so merge their lives that it 
can be said that they have assumed responsibility for each other and .... in the context of the 
Social Security Act, a heavy emphasis must be placed on the need for an assumption of 
financial responsibility or interdependence as part of that commitment. 
To summarise, where the "key positive features which are to be found in most legal 
marriages which have not broken down (cohabitation and a degree of companionship 
  
29 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J; 165 per Henry J; 184 per Thomas J.  Henry J points out that 
Tipping J did not necessarily purport to provide a checklist. 
30 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
31 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
32 Ruka, above n 1, 161-162 per Blanchard J. 
33 Ruka, above n 1, 185 per Thomas J. 
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demonstrating an emotional commitment)" are "found together with financial 
interdependence there will be such a merging of lives as equates for the purposes of the 
legislation to a legal marriage."34 
The majority said "it may be necessary to accept that the phrase 'relationship in the 
nature of marriage' need not have the same meaning in different statutes".35  The minority, 
however, could "see no reason to give the phrase as it is used in the Social Security Act 
1964 other than its ordinary meaning."36  They argued against a "restrictive construction" 
of the phrase, as accepting Ruka's submissions "would effectively take away rights which 
she and others in a like situation would otherwise have under the Act, and probably also 
under other legislation."37 
The minority said determining whether a relationship has "the essential character of a 
marriage", "will require an objective commonsense assessment of the factors which go to 
make up the particular relationship".38  Factors could include "joint living arrangements, 
an emotional and sexual relationship, duration, the creation of a family, the pooling of 
financial resources, the sharing of property, responsibilities and social activities", among 
others.39  For the minority, therefore, financial interdependence and emotional 
commitment were relevant but not determinative factors. 
Isabella Ruka was convicted of benefit fraud in both the District Court and the High 
Court,40 on the basis that she had fraudulently obtained benefits by wilfully omitting to 
tell the Department that she was living with a Mr T.  She defended the charges on the 
ground that she was suffering from "battered woman's syndrome", and therefore lacked 
intent to defraud the Department.  This defence was rejected in both the lower courts, and 
  
34 Ruka, above n 1, 162 per Blanchard J. 
35 Ruka, above n 1, 183 per Thomas J; see also 162 per Blanchard J.  Fisher J recognised this in Excell, 
above n 2, 248. 
36 Ruka, above n 1, 165 per Henry J. 
37 Ruka, above n 1, 165 per Henry J.  For example, if T had died, Ruka would not have been eligible 
for the widows' benefit.  However, she would have been eligible for the domestic purposes or 
unemployment benefit, so the problem envisaged by Henry J may not matter in practical terms.  
See also Part III B 3 for a discussion of eligibility for protection under the Domestic Violence Act 
1995. 
38 Ruka, above n 1, 165 per Henry J. 
39 Ruka, above n 1, 165 per Henry J. 
40 Under the Social Security Act 1964, s 127, and the Crimes Act 1961, s 229A. 
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was not argued in the Court of Appeal; however the majority said a battering relationship 
could negative factors which would otherwise indicate an emotional commitment.41 
Barker J in the High Court "took as his starting point the list formulated by Tipping J in 
Thompson".42  He noted the aspects of Ruka's relationship which indicated it was in the 
nature of marriage: they had lived together for over 14 years; they had a child and moved 
cities together; they shared a bedroom and a sexual relationship (although it was violent 
and non-consensual); they sometimes socialised together; and they presented to outsiders 
as a family unit.  Barker J set against these indicia the aspects which might indicate the 
absence of a relationship in the nature of marriage: T's continual violence towards Ruka; 
lack of financial support; lack of emotional dependence; T's limited parental involvement; 
and T's relationships with other women.43 
Barker J considered they were sufficiently committed to the relationship, so the "mental 
ingredient" identified by Tipping J in Thompson was present.  However, both the majority 
judgments in the Court of Appeal noted the "inconsistency"44 in Barker J's finding that 
Ruka "elected to continue with the relationship" even though she was "trapped" by T's 
violence and threats to kill her if she left.45 
For the majority, the clear lack of financial support, which was not the result of an 
"arrangement" between the two,46 coupled with the absence of an emotional commitment, 
meant that Ruka had not been living in a relationship in the nature of marriage with T, and 
the convictions were quashed. 
III DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND INCOME CONJUGAL STATUS POLICY 
A Department Policy Prior to Ruka 
When Ruka was decided, the relevant chapter in the Department policy manual, Core 
Topics, had last been revised in February 1994.47  Updates and circulars added to, rather 
than replaced, outdated policy information.48 
  
41 Ruka, above n 1, 158 per Blanchard J; 182 per Thomas J. 
42 Ruka, above n 1, 178 per Thomas J. 
43 Ruka, above n 1, 178 per Thomas J. 
44 Ruka, above n 1, 160 per Blanchard J; 179 per Thomas J. 
45 Barker J quoted in Ruka, above n 1, 179 per Thomas J (emphasis added by Thomas J). 
46 See Blanchard J's statement in the quote accompanying n 31. 
47 "Marital Status for Benefit Purposes" in Core Topics  (Income Support Service manual, July 1996) 
["Core Topics"]. 
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The influence of Excell and Thompson is clear.  The manual directs officers to consider 
factors such as shared dwelling and household activities, emotional support and 
dependence, pooled financial resources,49 exclusive sexual relationship, shared leisure and 
social activities, shared parental obligations, and presentation as a couple to outsiders.  At 
the end of the list, the manual almost quotes Excell: "The decision cannot be based on the 
absence or presence of any one single factor.  It is the quality, quantity, continuity and 
duration of all the factors found to exist that matters."50  Guidelines, comprising questions 
for applicants, help officers determine whether and to what extent the factors exist.51  For 
example, officers might ask an applicant how many nights per week they spend with their 
partner, or whether the partner disciplines the applicant's child.  A woman might be asked 
if she is known by her partner's name.  Other questions, such as whether the applicant 
uses their partner's car, who pays the rent, and in whose name the tenancy is held, were 
added in an update.52  According to that update:53 
The most reasoned viewpoint remains that no one factor by itself can constitute the 
establishment of a relationship and, no absence of a factor can be considered as determining a 
relationship.  No list that attempts to determine what constitutes a relationship could ever be 
exhaustive. 
B Department Response to Ruka 
1 Initial response 
Departmental policy was updated following Ruka, based on a Crown Law opinion on 
the implications of the judgment.54  The Department considers that its policy did not 
change significantly, as officers were already applying financial and emotional 
                                                                                                                                                                 
48 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, Department of Work and Income solicitor with responsibility for 
conjugal status policy (the author, Wellington, 5 July 2000). 
49 These seem to mirror the "key positive features" identified by Blanchard J in Ruka: cohabitation, 
companionship, financial interdependence (see the quote accompanying n 34). 
50 Core Topics, above n 47, 8.2123. 
51 "Guidelines For Section 63(b) Inquiries" in Core Topics, above n 47, Appendix II. 
52 ROAD, undated. 
53 ROAD, above n 52, s 3.7. 
54 The opinion was  requested by the Department on 4 October 1996 and received 17 October 1996: 
Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48.  The update, entitled "1996 087: Definition of a 
`relationship in the nature of a marriage'" ["Update 1996 087"], is still in place at time of writing.  A 
new policy is awaiting approval (see Part III B 2 below). 
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commitment factors, following Thompson.  Ruka meant simply that the legal test was 
"further refined".55 
A summary of the policy update says "the boundaries of this definition have been 
adjusted".  A "mutual commitment to financially support each other when required is a 
primary factor" and battered woman's syndrome "may lessen the relevance of the 
traditional indicators".56 
The update outlines the facts in Ruka which, under former policy, would have led to 
the conclusion that it was a relationship in the nature of marriage, such as the duration, 
child together, social activities together, moving cities, set against the violence and the lack 
of financial or other support.  It says the Court of Appeal "concluded that the central 
question was whether there was such a lack of financial interdependence between the 
parties to the relationship that it could not properly be described as in the nature of a 
marriage."57 
The update says "physical evidence of joint finances is sufficient to indicate financial 
interdependence",58 and gives as examples: joint hire purchase agreements, joint bank 
accounts, both partners contributing to household expenses.59  The Solicitor-General is 
quoted: "in the absence of any jointly owned property or shared living expenses, a 
relationship in the nature of marriage could only be said to exist if sufficient evidence of 
the requisite mutual commitment to financially support can be gleaned from other 
traditional indicators."60 
According to the update, "the issue is not as simple as whether or not a particular 
couple can be said to have separate finances"; rather, the "critical question" is whether the 
parties "have a mutual commitment to financially support each other in the future, if and 
when the need arises, and to the extent that the parties are in a position to provide such 
support".61  Testing this "may require an assessment of a couple's state of mind about the 
future", as "[e]ven though the parties' finances are entirely separate, it is possible that a 
  
55 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
56 Update 1996 087, above n 54, ss 1.1-1.3. 
57 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 2.5. 
58 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.2. 
59 However, Appeal Authority decisions show "physical evidence" is not necessarily sufficient; the 
Authority is willing to hear credible reasons for joint finances.  See Part IV. 
60 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.2. 
61 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.3. 
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couple might still have the commitment to provide each other with financial support."62 
This may interpret a little too broadly the statement in Ruka that a commitment to support 
the other partner "must amount to a willingness to support, if the need exists".63  The 
Department's interpretation could apply to a couple who are not financially 
interdependent, but realise they may one day, "in the future", be sufficiently committed to 
support each other financially.  The emphasis in Ruka seems to be more on present 
willingness to support.  Ruka refers to financial support being "available", and an 
"acceptance"64 to support (paying expenses as they arise), which is more concrete, and 
easier to prove, than a commitment to provide support in the future.65 
Consistent with Ruka,66 absence of support is not genuine if it is "motivated by the 
knowledge that the dependent partner will then be able to claim a benefit."67  A refusal to 
support "would need to be looked at in the context of the relationship as a whole", and "it 
might be concluded that a refusal to provide financial support was merely a sham" if "all 
or most of the other indicators of a relationship in the nature of a marriage were found to 
be present."68  Officers are directed to "consider past, present and future behaviour".  For 
example: "who has paid which expenses traditionally, and if one of the children required 
urgent medical attention tomorrow, who would meet the cost?" 
The update emphasises the "battered woman" aspect of Ruka, even "to the point where 
the decision in Ruka might have been misinterpreted as applying only where battered 
woman's syndrome was present".69  The update says the syndrome is not a defence, and 
"there would need to be reasonably compelling evidence", but it "should be taken into 
account when considering the normal factors relevant to whether there is a relationship in 
the nature of marriage".  For example, a beneficiary may be living under the same roof "out 
of fear and helplessness", or sexual intercourse may be coerced.70 
  
62 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.4. 
63 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
64 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
65 See Part V for discussion of problems associated with "willingness" to support. 
66 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
67 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.8. 
68 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.8. 
69 John Hughes "Battered Woman's Syndrome and `Interdependence' as Factors in Establishing 
Conjugal Status in Social Security Law" (1999) 7 Waikato LR 104, 127-128. 
70 Update 1996 087, above n 54, s 3.1.8. 
984 (2001) 32 VUWLR 
In addition to the policy update, the Department responded by urging a change to the 
law to lessen the impact of Ruka.  The Social Security (Conjugal Status) Amendment Bill 
(1997) would have removed the emphasis on financial interdependence, as one of the 
Department's main concerns is that beneficiaries will arrange their finances so they appear 
to be separate from those of their partner.  The Department no longer actively supports the 
Bill; it is still on the legislative agenda, but nothing has been done to further it for three 
years.  The Department says, "It appears that the Bill was a legitimate response to concerns 
which have not eventuated to the extent that they initially appeared they would."71 
2 Recent changes to Department policy 
The Benefit Control Manual has been revised over the last year.  Criticism by 
commentators that the conjugal status section does not adequately reflect Ruka influenced 
the Department to rewrite the policy.72  A draft chapter, approved by the Department,73 is 
awaiting approval from the Ministry of Social Policy, and should be implemented during 
2001. 
Steven Price describes the Department's pamphlets, policy manuals and computer 
systems as containing "nary a trace" of Ruka, because the policy includes financial 
interdependence and emotional commitment "simply as factors in a long list of things".74  
John Hughes criticised the Department for continuing "to a large extent to apply the pre-
Ruka policy ... as if that decision had never been delivered."75  These deficiencies probably 
derive partly from the Department's former practice of circulating policy updates, rather 
than rewriting the relevant sections of the manual. 
The draft chapter notes the phrase "relationship in the nature of marriage" is not 
defined in the Act, and that "guidance for the interpretation of these terms comes from 
case law".76  Summaries of Ruka, Thompson, and Excell follow. 
  
71 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
72 Another influential factor was the change of government, leading to a push by beneficiary 
advocacy groups for the manuals to be rewritten: Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
73 "Conjugal Status Draft" in Benefit Control Manual (Department of Work and Income, May 2000) 
["Draft Chapter"]. 
74 Steven Price "Winz Policies Ignore Ruka Judgment" (15 February 2000) Evening Post, Wellington, 
New Zealand. 
75 "Battered Woman's Syndrome and `Interdependence' as Factors in Establishing Conjugal Status in 
Social Security Law", above n 69. 
76 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 42. 
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The summary of Ruka outlines the salient facts.  It quotes from three parts of Blanchard 
J's judgment: (1) emphasising the importance of financial interdependence and "sufficient 
features evidencing a continuing emotional commitment"; (2) comparing the "key positive 
features" of most legal marriages (cohabitation, companionship, emotional commitment), 
noting that "[w]here these are found together with financial interdependence there will be 
such a merging of lives as equates for the purposes of the legislation to a legal marriage"; 
and (3) describing battered woman's syndrome as a factor to be considered. 
The summary of Thompson quotes Tipping J's ten physical aspects, and notes that the 
"ultimate question will always be one of fact and degree."  The "mental ingredient" - a 
commitment by the parties "for the foreseeable future" to their relationship - must also be 
considered.  The summary of Excell quotes Fisher J's core elements. 
The draft chapter then sets out Department policy.  For people who are not legally 
married, "it must be shown that there is both: a degree of companionship demonstrating 
an emotional commitment; and financial interdependence".77  Echoing Ruka,78 it 
continues: "The commitment must go beyond mere sharing of living expenses, as platonic 
flatmates or siblings living together may do; it must amount to a willingness to support if 
the need exists, as well as a degree of companionship demonstrating an emotional 
commitment."  Further, "from the legislation and case law we can see that when 
considering whether a relationship is 'in the nature of marriage' there are a number of 
indicators we can use to determine the situation."  The indicators are listed as:79 
 
Direct financial interdependence such as joint bank accounts or assets or joint loans/credit; 
Willingness to support if the need exists; 
Mutually agreed financial arrangements; 
Emotional commitment and support for each other; 
Joint decision making and plans together; 
Period of the relationship; 
Sharing of one dwelling (full time, part time); 
Sharing of one bedroom; 
A sexual relationship; 
Sharing of parental obligations; 
Sharing of household activities; 
Sharing of companionship/spare time; 
Sharing of leisure and social activities; 
 
77 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 46. 
78 Ruka, above n 1, 161. 
79 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 46. 
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Presentation to outsiders as a couple; 
A relationship exclusive of others. 
In comparison, legally married couples who reside in the same place would find it 
"difficult (though not impossible) ... to substantiate a claim that they are 'living apart' for 
the purposes of section 63(a)".80  Regarding a legally married person as living apart from 
their spouse requires a physical separation and a "mental acceptance" by one or both of the 
parties that "the marriage, as an emotional bond, is over."81  If they reside separately, "an 
assessment of the indicators used for unmarried people can be used to determine their 
conjugal status for benefit purposes."82  These indicators help establish whether the 
"mental acceptance" exists.  Unlike de facto relationships, financial interdependence is 
relevant but not essential.83 
As in the update, the draft chapter reiterates that a "refusal to support, or an 
arrangement that support will not be given ... motivated by the knowledge that the 
dependent partner will then be able to claim a benefit" will not "create a genuine absence 
of financial support."84  This also applies to legal marriages. 
Evidence which shows whether the indicators are present can be obtained from 
interviews with the person and the alleged partner, "giving them the opportunity to 
explain the situation" (unless they refuse to be interviewed), and statements from 
"witnesses such as landlords, neighbours, friends, family and other acquaintances."85  
Documentary evidence might include: tenancy agreements; bank records; credit or loan 
documents; public records; hire purchase agreements; school enrolment forms; local 
authority records; birth or marriage registration; vehicle and property registration; club 
memberships.86 
In addition to the revised policy, a new information booklet for beneficiaries was 
published recently.87  It aims to explain Ruka in lay terms: 
  
80 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 47. 
81 Director-General of Social Welfare v W [1997] NZFLR 152, 155 (HC) per McGechan J [D-GSW v W]. 
82 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 47. 
83 D-GSW v W, above n 81, 156.  See Part V for further comment. 
84 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 47. 
85 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 48. 
86 Draft Chapter, above n 73, 48. 
87 Department of Work and Income "Relationships and Income Support: Things You Need to Know 
About Relationships When Getting Income Support" (April 2000). 
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If you share your life with someone of the opposite sex in a way that is 'like marriage', you're 
in a relationship.  You're in a relationship that's 'like marriage' if you and your partner are 
committed to each other emotionally and have a financial interdependence with each other. 
To help applicants determine the status of their relationship, questions referring to the 
traditional indicators are set out.  The booklet also says "You can't use your income 
support just to become financially independent of your partner while you're in a 
relationship", but notes that if an applicant is "thinking about leaving a violent 
relationship, we may be able to give you extra financial help". 
In sum, financial interdependence and emotional commitment are now emphasised as 
the two main components of the policy, with the other traditional indicators still relevant.  
Although the policy update issued after Ruka noted the importance of financial 
interdependence, its interpretation of "willingness to support" was potentially misleading.  
Moreover, it did not replace former policy.  It seems that the Department has taken on 
board the criticisms of commentators, and has now clarified their conjugal status policy to 
bring it in line with Ruka. 
3 Policy in practice 
The Department says that in practice financial interdependence and emotional support 
are the two primary elements, and indicia such as those in Thompson go towards 
establishing those two elements; "in the end, it is an 'overall assessment' based on the 
usually unique facts of each case".88 
People are often more willing to acknowledge emotional commitment, so cases are 
usually argued on the basis of financial interdependence.  The Department looks for 
willingness to support, that is, the potential to support if the person stopped receiving the 
benefit.89  The Department, therefore, continues to emphasise this notion above actual 
support.90 
Factors which show financial interdependence become factors which show emotional 
commitment, and vice versa.  Together the factors "create a picture".91  Primary indicators 
of actual financial support are those things most couples have: joint bank accounts, 
tenancy agreement in both names, guarantors on hire purchase, gifts unusual in a non-
emotional relationship (such as a car).  Also, the beneficiary might give their status as "de 
  
88 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
89 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
90 See Part V for discussion of problems associated with "willingness" to support. 
91 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
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facto" on hospital forms or finance applications.  The Department generally considers that 
couples should not be seen as de facto in some areas and not in others.   
Domestic violence as a factor negating a relationship in the nature of marriage is seen 
by the Department as problematic, because the Court in Ruka said violence amounting to 
battered woman's syndrome could negate emotional commitment, but did not rule on the 
issue because it was not argued on appeal.  Furthermore, it is difficult to determine when a 
relationship reaches that point. 
A further complication arises with domestic protection orders as a means of 
establishing a violent relationship.  A beneficiary may be living with a partner for the 
purposes of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, while claiming a benefit on the basis that they 
are not living in a relationship in the nature of marriage.  This was alluded to as a potential 
problem in the minority judgment in Ruka.92  In my view this is not necessarily 
problematic, as the Domestic Violence Act expressly covers relationships which are not 
"partner" relationships.93  The Social Security Appeal Authority has rejected the 
Department's argument that a domestic protection order could "amount to a concession 
that the close relationship or domestic relationship" was in the nature of marriage.94  
Further, as the majority in Ruka noted, the phrase may be defined differently in other 
legislative contexts.95 
Department officers learn about policy on a six week induction course. Conjugal status 
forms a small part of the total training, as there is much material to be covered.96  Officers 
have access to the Benefit Control Manual and MAP, the online manual, together with the 
advice of Department solicitors.  Service centre managers could be expected to understand 
the test in Ruka, but frontline staff would know the basic indicators of a relationship in the 
nature of marriage.  There are practical difficulties in ensuring policy is applied properly, 
as the Department has 5000 employees.97 
The Department would prefer beneficiaries to explain their situation if unsure of their 
conjugal status.  Presently, the Department's approach is to trust a beneficiary's assessment 
of their conjugal status unless and until the Department has reason to suspect they are 
living in a relationship in the nature of marriage. 
  
92 Ruka, above n 1, 165 per Henry J.  
93 See the definition of "close personal relationship", Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 4. 
94 Decision 19/2000 (16 February 2000) (Latham, McKelvey, Tukukino), 4. 
95 Ruka, above n 1, 162 per Blanchard J; 183 per Thomas J. 
96 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
97 Interview with Kirsty Wilson, above n 48. 
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The Benefit Control Unit is responsible for investigating allegations that a beneficiary is 
living with a partner.  Sharing of information between the police and the Department can 
lead to an investigation, as the partner may be prosecuted for an unrelated crime, and give 
their address as that of the beneficiary. 
Department officers have wide powers to ask for information, and there is a duty on 
every person (such as neighbours and bank staff) to answer questions put to them.98  
Department officers have no automatic powers to search, but they can obtain a search 
warrant which would be executed by and with the police. 
Where the Department believes a beneficiary has been overpaid but is not guilty of 
fraud (that is, they have not deliberately misled the Department as to their conjugal 
status), or there are mitigating circumstances, repayment is sought under section 86 of the 
Social Security Act.99  The beneficiary's conjugal status must be proved on the balance of 
probabilities.  If the Department believes a beneficiary has been overpaid as a result of 
fraud, they may take one or both of two options.  They may seek repayment and a penalty 
under section 86, where the beneficiary's conjugal status and the fraud must be proved on 
the balance of probabilities.100  Alternatively and in addition, the Department may bring a 
criminal prosecution under section 127, where the beneficiary's conjugal status and the 
fraud must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  In both civil claims and criminal 
prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the Department. 
IV SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL AUTHORITY DECISIONS SINCE RUKA 
The general approach of the Social Security Appeal Authority, indicated by decisions 
since Ruka, is to consider the sort of indicia set out in Thompson, and make an "overall 
assessment".  Ruka is taken into account, but somewhat unevenly. 
In their first decision relating to section 63(b) delivered after Ruka, the Authority said 
Excell and Thompson "culminated in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ruka".101  They 
continued: "Various indicia ... have been propounded and in particular, Tipping J in 
Thompson has listed 10 of such matters.  We mention some as far as being applicable to this 
case".102  The Authority notes the extent to which the parties lived in the same house; had 
  
98 Social Security Act 1964, ss 11, 12. 
99 According to Kirsty Wilson, above n 48: "Repayment is sought under all circumstances.  The 
Department rarely seeks reparation orders as its ability to recover by deduction from benefit and 
bank accounts is far reaching". 
100 The standard of proof was established in Director-General of Social Welfare v Ilyes [1997] NZAR 292 
(HC). 
101 Decision 108/96 (5 November 1996) Social Security Appeal Authority  (Latham, Dell, Morgan) 3. 
102 Decision 108/96, above n 101, 3-4. 
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a sexual relationship; gave each other emotional support and companionship; socialised 
together; shared responsibility for children and domestic tasks; and shared "costs and 
other financial resources by pooling all resources or otherwise".103  As the hearing was 
prior to Ruka, "[l]ittle was said as to financial dependence or sharing"; nevertheless, the 
Authority concludes that "there was little, if any, sharing of financial resources and 
certainly not to the extent we would expect of a married couple."  The Authority then 
seems to decide the appeal on the basis of the Thompson approach:104 
Thus while on the indicia we have identified there are some matters that perhaps could be said 
to count both ways, ... we think that the proper course after considering the indicia is to stand 
back and look at the situation as a whole.  In doing just that we are unable to conclude that the 
parties were living together in a state of marriage.  The negative aspects as it were, 
outweighing the positive ... . 
It is understandable that a decision delivered one month after Ruka, where the appeal 
was heard prior to Ruka, does not strictly follow Ruka.  However I would argue that, in 
general, this continues to be the Authority's approach. 
In the next appeal post-Ruka, the Authority said:105 
[T]he Courts have laid down a number of indicia from which the inference can be drawn that 
two people are living in a state of marriage.  It is not necessary for the Department in any case 
to prove all the indicia so listed, but to establish several and enough to give rise to that 
inference.  ... [In Ruka] [t]he Court of Appeal acknowledged the practice of listing certain 
indicia, but laid emphasis on one factor that has always, to the Authority's knowledge, been 
regarded as one of the indicia ... that is the financial interdependence of the two persons.  In 
addition, the Court of Appeal stressed that there must be either direct evidence or by inference 
of a commitment between the two of a sharing for a significant time in the future, not 
necessarily a permanent "till death us do part" sort of commitment, but at least to the point that 
the commitment would remain for an indefinite period in the future. 
Nonetheless, the Department's approach was to "lead evidence to prove certain of the 
indicia that have been listed", and to invite the Authority to "draw the inference" that the 
parties were "living in a state of marriage".106  The Authority said, "Not one of these 
matters standing alone would enable that inference so to be drawn, it is the cumulative 
  
103 Decision 108/96, above n 101, 4. 
104 Decision 108/96, above n 101, 5. 
105 Decision 22/97 (29 January 1997) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, Dell, Morgan) 2-3. 
106 Decision 22/97, above n 105, 3. 
 DETERMINING A RELATIONSHIP IN THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE 991 
effect of several that is sought and should be relied upon."107  Allowing the appeal, it was 
the appellant's credible rebuttal of the Department's evidence that meant the "cumulative 
effect" of the evidence was insufficient to establish a relationship in the nature of 
marriage.108 
By contrast, in a decision delivered two months later, the Authority clearly applied 
Ruka.109  The hearing took place shortly before Ruka, and the Authority reserved their 
decision until after Ruka, to receive further submissions.110  The Authority said the 
"essential matters" in Ruka ("financial interdependence and a commitment, one to the 
other, although perhaps not a commitment 'till death us do part'") were lacking:111 
There was no sharing of resources and no contribution made by [him] towards the household.  
In view of the importance placed upon this aspect by the Court of Appeal, we are compelled to 
hold, in the light of the Ruka decision that there was no "state of marriage" ... notwithstanding 
some acknowledged sexual activity ... which we think was a case of [his] taking what he 
wanted and going. 
In another decision, the Authority considered two relationships of the appellant, and 
found the first to have been in the nature of marriage (they had a sexual relationship, he 
supported her financially, photographs showed a "happy family unit", and three years 
together indicated sufficient commitment).112  In this relationship the "aspects mentioned 
in Ruka" were "satisfied", that is, "financial independence"113 (the Authority must mean 
interdependence) and a "commitment for the future".114  The Authority says: "Viewed 
therefore as a whole and without seeing the necessity to traverse the indicia raised in Excell 
and/or Thompson but having those in our minds, we have come to the conclusion that the 
Department has proved on the balance of probabilities that there was a state of 
marriage".115  However the second relationship was found to be "with more of a sugar 
  
107 Decision 22/97, above n 105, 3. 
108 Decision 22/97, above n 105, 5. 
109 Decision 42/97 (26 March 1997) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, Dell, Morgan). 
110 The Authority notes that the Department's further submissions were "less than helpful": Decision 
42/97, above n 109, 3. 
111 Decision 42/97, above n 109, 3-4.  The overpayment was cancelled by the Authority, and the 
appellant appealed against conviction for benefit fraud: R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA). 
112 Decision 91/97 (9 July 1997) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, Dell, Morgan) 5. 
113 Decision 91/97, above n 112, 4. 
114 Decision 91/97, above n 112, 5. 
115 Decision 91/97, above n 112, 5. 
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daddy than a partner"116 (they lived together briefly, had a non-exclusive sexual 
relationship, had two overseas holidays together, and he gave her $15,000 to buy a house). 
Much depends on the credibility of the appellant and the quality of the evidence, as 
exemplified by Decisions 92/97117 and 106/98,118 which concern the same relationship but 
have different results: in the former, he was found to have been living in a relationship in 
the nature of marriage, while in the latter, she was not.  In Decision 92/97, the Authority 
did not regard the male appellant as credible.  They said the "most important factor in our 
view is the question of financial independence"119 (again, they must mean 
interdependence).  The parties had bought a house as tenants in common, and he gave her 
his bankcard, with which she made supermarket purchases.  The Authority found there 
was "sufficient evidence to satisfy the test of financial independence as formulated in Ruka 
in that it was more than simply a case of sharing expenses as would happen in say a joint 
flatting situation but in the real sense the appellant was paying towards the household out 
of that bank account."120  Further, "As was said in Excell, at the end of the day one must 
stand back and look at all circumstances including after Ruka, in particular, the financial 
circumstances".121  In Decision 106/98 the Authority heard much more evidence from the 
female appellant, and found that any financial interdependence was in fact insufficient, 
and that there was no emotional commitment.  The pair had three children together, but 
their sexual relationship was infrequent, he was away most of the time, and there was no 
evidence of socialising together.  So, "looking at the matter as a whole, the evidence falls 
short of establishing that the parties were living in a state of marriage".122 
Evidence of financial support (such as paying bills) is not fatal to the appellant's case if 
it is found to have been for the benefit of the children,123 or that one partner has acted as 
guarantor on a hire purchase application if they did so because the other had a bad credit 
rating.124  Conversely, minimal evidence of financial support may be sufficient.  In 
  
116 Decision 91/97, above n 112, 6. 
117 Decision 92/97 (21 July 1997) Social Security Appeal Authority  (Latham, Morgan). 
118 Decision 106/98 (25 November 1998) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, Dell, Morgan). 
119 Decision 92/97, above n 117, 4. 
120 Decision 92/97, above n 117, 5. 
121 Decision 92/97, above n 117, 5. 
122 Decision 106/98, above n 118, 7. 
123 For example, Decision 72/99 (27 July 1999) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, Dell). 
124 Decision 36/2000 (15 March 2000) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, McKelvey, 
Tukukino). 
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Decision 8/2000, the appellant relied on a lack of financial commitment and cited Ruka.  The 
Authority thought:125 
the evidence relating to financial support by [him] is not great [it appears he and his family 
provided money for the child] but we think that there was some such support [and] when that 
is combined with the other factors which the Department relied upon [statements by the 
appellant that they lived as a "family"], which we accept, we are constrained to hold on the 
balance of probabilities that they did and were living in a state of marriage ... . 
In Decision 17/2000, the Authority noted that the majority in Ruka held that financial 
interdependence is the "crucial factor", but (quoting Ruka) it must be "accompanied by 
sufficient features showing a continuing emotional commitment".126  The Authority set 
out the ten indicia from Thompson, and found that "in terms of the list of indicia to which 
we have referred, the parties were living in a state of marriage";127 further, "[t]aken as a 
whole we think that the Department has proved [the relationship] on the balance of 
probabilities".128 
The Authority seems to narrow the application of Ruka in one decision.  They are 
"mindful" of Ruka and "of the importance placed by the majority ... [on] the financial 
position but we do remind ourselves that Ruka was a criminal case and it was further 
complicated by the 'battered wives syndrome'."129 
A non-exclusive sexual relationship is a common factor in undermining the existence 
of a relationship in the nature of marriage.  The Authority has said it "demonstrates that 
there was no commitment ... to the appellant as a partner.  ... [H]e was leading the double 
life as it were [which] ... derogates from the concept of marriage as being a one man one 
woman relationship."130 
  
125 Decision 8/2000 (25 January 2000) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, Dell, McKelvey) 4 
(emphasis added). 
126 Decision 17/2000 (16 February 2000) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, McKelvey, 
Tukukino) 2; Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
127 Decision 17/2000, above n 126, 7. 
128 Decision 17/2000, above n 126, 8. 
129 Decision 19/2000 (16 February 2000) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, McKelvey, 
Tukukino)  4. 
130 Decision 69/2000 (24 May 2000) Social Security Appeal Authority (Latham, McKelvey, Tukukino) 4. 
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Decision 86/2000 concerns section 63(a), a determination that a legally married couple 
were "living together".  Neverthless, it gives insight into Department interviewing 
methods:131 
[T]he record of the interview [19 March 1999] does indicate something of a tendency on the 
part of the investigators to simply ask questions which were focussed on obtaining answers to 
prove that the appellant was living with her husband in accordance with a list of indicia rather 
than a more general discussion to determine the nature of the relationship ... . 
The Authority, therefore, does apply Ruka, principally by noting that the financial 
aspects of the relationship are of particular significance.  Factors which might indicate 
financial interdependence assume greater or lesser importance depending on the other 
"indicia" of the relationship, which is consistent with Ruka.132 
The clearest trend to emerge in the Authority decisions, however, is the "broad value 
judgment" approach advocated in Excell133 and endorsed by the minority in Ruka.134  The 
Authority tends to base its ultimate decision on an "overall assessment" of the relationship, 
exemplified by this statement: "We think with Fisher J [in Excell] that at the end of the day 
one should stand back, look at the whole of the evidence and make a decision".135  This 
approach is not referred to by the majority in Ruka, but may be reconciled with the notion 
of the parties "so merging their lives".136  I will now argue that the requirement for 
financial interdependence is problematic, and suggest that the notion of the parties "so 
merging their lives" may be more helpful in determining a relationship in the nature of 
marriage. 
V PROBLEMS WITH RUKA 
The definition of de facto relationships in the context of social security has generated 
considerable controversy, including press comment, academic debate, and court appeals.  
Determining whether a beneficiary is living in a relationship in the nature of marriage 
involves government officials investigating the intimate relationships of some of the state's 
more vulnerable citizens.  Moreover, the decision has grave consequences for the 
  
131 Decision 86/2000 (10 July 2000) Social Security Appeal Authority (Wallace, McKelvey, Tukukino) 8.  
This decision was made with a different chairperson, and is significantly longer than most of the 
decisions. 
132 See Blanchard J's statement in the quote accompanying n 32. 
133 Excell, above n 2, 248. 
134 Ruka, above n 1, 167 per Henry J. 
135 Decision 75/97 (3 June 1997) Social Security Appeal Authority  (Latham, Dell, Morgan) 7. 
136 Ruka, above n 1, 162 per Blanchard J; 185 per Thomas J. 
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beneficiary, as recognised by the Appeal Authority.  They have stressed "the need for 
careful investigation in issues of this nature because the step of cancellation of a benefit is 
a very serious issue for the beneficiary", so the discretion "has to be exercised ... with the 
utmost care".137  Therefore it is desirable that the law be certain, and not based on 
personal opinion or a "merely intuitive" application of the law.138 
 
To a degree Ruka does clarify the law in this area, as it provides a test for de facto 
relationships in the social security context.  John Hughes argued several years earlier that 
the "economic" aspects of a relationship should be an essential consideration,139 and so 
approves of the emphasis on financial interdependence in Ruka.  He suggests that Ruka 
"accurately reflected the purpose of the principle underlying the marital status rule in 
social security", and "set out a clear and workable test."140 
I would submit that the test in Ruka is not so workable, and may be illusory, because it 
is still up to the decision-maker to accord weight to the evidence and credibility of 
witnesses, typically on an "overall assessment" basis.  Although the focus on financial 
interdependence is logical given that the Act is concerned with providing financial 
assistance for people who need it, "financial interdependence" involves conceptual 
difficulties. 
The requirement in Ruka that financial interdependence "must amount to a willingness 
to support, if the need exists"141 is problematic.  This is a concern because it has become 
the Department's focus, and has been endorsed recently by the Court of Appeal in R v 
Batt.142  One of the grounds of appeal in Batt was this statement by the trial Judge:143 
[I]t appears that Mr Vercoe did not have to support Mrs Batt, because she was of course 
receiving a benefit.  Conversely, it appears that Mrs Batt did not have to support Mr Vercoe, 
because for most of the period in question he was apparently working. 
 
137 Decision 135/97 (17 December 1997) Social Security Appeal Authority (Middleton, Dell, Morgan), 
9. 
138 Atkin, above n 4, 18. 
139 John Hughes "Domestic Purposes Benefit: Lessons from the Furmage Case" [1979] NZLJ 32. 
140 "Battered Woman's Syndrome and `Interdependence' as Factors in Establishing Conjugal Status in 
Social Security Law", above n 69, 144. 
141 Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
142 R v Batt (3 August 2000) Unreported Court of Appeal CA 47/00 per Tipping, Heron, Williams JJ.  
Paragraph numbers refer to a version from Brooker's website: 
<http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments/Default.asp?doc=2000ca047.htm> (last accessed 
18 August 2000). 
143 R v Batt, above n 142, quoted in para 24. 
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The appellant argued this created an "inevitable inference" that "had either party not 
been able to support themselves an obligation of support from the other would have come 
into play".144  The Court of Appeal disagreed.  The Judge was "simply indicating that 
there was no occasion in which the support issue was put to practical application or 
test".145  I would suggest that in most cases where a person receives a benefit they will not 
need the support of a partner, so naturally it will not be put to the test, regardless of 
whether their relationship is in the nature of marriage.  The approach seems circular and 
does not help to clarify the issue. 
 
As noted above,146 the emphasis in Ruka seems to be on actual financial support, or an 
identifiable acceptance that support will be provided when necessary.  In Ruka a constant 
and deliberate unwillingness to provide support, even though there was a clear need, 
meant there was no financial interdependence.  The Department's approach could mean 
many more types of relationship are in the nature of marriage, as the factors which show 
emotional commitment (which people more readily acknowledge) can be used to show the 
potential or willingness to support financially if the need arose (that is, if the benefit were 
stopped).147   Some people in "boyfriend-girlfriend relationships" would help out 
financially if the need arose, though it would be a distortion to describe their relationship 
as being in the nature of marriage. 
Further, it may be difficult to ascertain whether a couple have deliberately separated 
their finances to obtain a benefit, or if they want to keep their finances separate for 
ideological or personal reasons.  A couple may be emotionally committed but separate 
their finances because they do not wish to be financially committed to each other.  John 
Hughes calls this a "catch 22" for beneficiaries: "If they pool resources to any degree this is 
prima facie evidence of the existence of a de facto relationship; if they consciously avoid 
pooling resources they may be regarded as merely attempting to 'influence external 
appearances'."148 
If one partner refuses to support the other, "motivated by the knowledge that the 
dependent partner will then be able to claim a benefit",149 it seems unfair that the 
 
144 R v Batt, above n 142, para 25. 
145 R v Batt, above n 142, para 25. 
146 See Part III B 1. 
147 In Batt the Court said "[i]n the end willingness to provide financial support must be an inference 
drawn from the interdependence of the relationship itself", above n 142, para 18. 
148 "Domestic Purposes Benefit: Lessons from the Furmage Case", above n 139, 38. 
149 As referred to in Ruka, above n 1, 161 per Blanchard J. 
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dependent partner cannot rely on either their partner or the state for financial support.  
This is likely to impact disproportionately on women (especially with dependent 
children), who make up the vast majority of appellants. 
It seems inconsistent that financial interdependence is not an essential consideration 
for legally married couples.150  They are "deemed to have assumed [financial] 
responsibility" for each other, while in de facto relationships it "must exist in fact before it 
can be said that the relationship is one in the nature of marriage".151  Section 63(b) enables 
the Department to treat a beneficiary as married, even though the beneficiary has no legal 
means of forcing their partner to support them.  As stated in Ruka, "for married persons 
financial obligations are not voluntary: the dependent spouse has some right to 
maintenance".152  It appears contradictory that the relationship is treated as being in the 
nature of marriage when the vital aspect of a legal marriage (in the context of social 
security), the legal right to maintenance, is in fact lacking. 
Emotional commitment may be less problematic conceptually than financial 
interdependence, and has been described as a "more sustainable option".153  As Judge 
Shaw said, "to simply view the physical aspects of the relationship and draw an inference 
from those is to take a naive approach to the complex and subtle dynamic which makes up 
a commitment between two people".154  However, it is hard to see how a focus on 
emotional commitment could avoid the "overall assessment" approach, which seems 
ultimately to be based on an intuitive impression. 
In my view, the concept of the parties "so merging their lives" should take priority over 
financial interdependence.  It was mentioned in Thompson155 and appears in both the 
majority judgments in Ruka.156  Combined with an overall assessment of the relationship's 
tangible features (the "indicia") and the emotional commitment, this approach might 
provide a more accurate picture of the relationship. 
  
150 See D-GSW v W, above n 81. 
151 Ruka, above n 1, 182 per Thomas J. 
152 Ruka, above n 1, 162 per Blanchard J.  Each party is liable to maintain their spouse during and after 
marriage in certain circumstances (see the Family Proceedings Act 1980, ss 63, 64). 
153 Elisabeth McDonald "A Relationship in the Nature of Marriage" [1996] NZLJ 423, 424. 
154 Department of Social Welfare v Te Mounanui (18 March 1996) Unreported  District Court  Henderson 
Registry. 
155 Thompson, above n 3, 374. 
156 Ruka, above n 1, 162 per Blanchard J; 182, 185 per Thomas J. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
John Hughes argues that in Ruka the Court of Appeal "radically redefined the concept 
of 'de facto' marriage for social security purposes".157  I would suggest that Ruka was not 
so radical, neither in its potential nor actual impact.  The Appeal Authority decisions 
illustrate the infinite variety of human relationships, and it may be too simplistic to 
attempt to narrow the test to financial interdependence; the additional requirement of 
emotional commitment allows the real nature of the relationship to be considered, but it 
also means that the factors set out in Thompson retain their importance.  Ruka certainly 
made the financial aspect of a relationship the dominant factor, but this approach is 
problematic. 
Perhaps, in the end, the best way to determine whether a relationship is in the nature 
of marriage is to consider the various factors set out in the case law, to see if there is a 
sufficient degree of emotional commitment, and to make an "overall assessment" as to 
whether the parties have "so merged their lives" that their relationship can be equated with 
a legal marriage.  In the context of social security, it is crucial that the applicant or 
beneficiary does in fact need the support of the state, regardless of the presence or quality 
of their relationship. 
It has taken almost four years for the conjugal status policy and practice of the 
Department of Work and Income to be revised fully to reflect the law in Ruka more 
accurately.  The new draft chapter on conjugal status, and the informational material 
available to applicants, represent a significant improvement, as they set out the principles 
in Ruka much more clearly. 
What is not so clear, however, is whether applying Ruka in practice makes much 
difference to beneficiaries.  In the Appeal Authority's "overall assessment" approach, 
evidence sufficient to amount to financial support or emotional commitment in one 
situation is insufficient to indicate a relationship in the nature of marriage in another 
situation.  This may owe more to the fact that human relationships are too complex and 
variable to define satisfactorily, than to the adequacy or otherwise of legal tests, social 
security policy, and the approaches of decision-makers. 
 
157 "Battered Woman's Syndrome and 'Interdependence' as Factors in Establishing Conjugal Status in 
Social Security Law", above n 69, 104. 
